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Abstract
What can film teach us about political rhetoric? Although many different types 
of speech and argument are to be found in cinematic productions, films rarely 
present a single or clear-cut argumentative case like a formal oration. Instead, 
dialogue conforms to a wider narrative process, anchoring speech in cinema’s 
visual form of storytelling. But if, as Richard Rushton claims, films can present 
narrative arguments that depict the tentative formation of subjectivity, we still 
need to account for the way audiences are lured into identifying with those nar-
ratives. In this paper I draw upon Lacanian film theory – specifically the notion 
of “the gaze” – to explain how film enacts a form of rhetorical “exigence” that 
disrupts the visual field to stimulate spectators’ desire and invite resolution. Two 
recent films about Churchill are used to illustrate this point. Political rhetoric, I 
conclude, might therefore usefully be conceived as a visually oriented practice.
Keywords: Winston Churchill, rhetoric, cinema, psychoanalysis
1. Introduction
What can cinema tell us about political rhetoric? There are, without a doubt, 
many great moments of oratory to be found in cinema films, as well as strik-
ing turns of phrase, sharp verbal exchanges or revealing deliberations. Cinema 
enables spectators to experience a deep, affective involvement with individuals, 
their actions, and their utterances that would make any speech writer envious. 
But spoken rhetoric in film rarely does the work that an entire speech does in 
public or political life, even when the story is about political figures. While cin-
ema draws intellectual interest from philosophers for its aesthetic qualities or its 
resonance with topics of social and political significance (see Shaw, 2008), its re-
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lation to rhetorical argument is less clear. Notable rhetorical interventions take a 
subordinate role to the wider considerations of narrative, action, and plot. When 
speeches are depicted, they are often brief or in part, illustrations of a character’s 
qualities or markers of a decisive moment within the plot. Equally, outside of 
openly “rhetorical narratives” in documentaries or “essay films”, which may pre-
sent an explicitly argued case (see Bordwell and Thompson, 1993: 112–19) or 
“diegetic” voice-overs that enunciate from off-screen (see Bordwell, 1985: 16–
26), overtly political films or films with a social message rarely offer a single or 
clear-cut speech delivered directly to camera. Instead, we apprehend any overall 
message in mediated form, by way of interpersonal conflicts, character develop-
ment, dynamic action and movement, or the unfolding of a narrative arc that in-
volves multiple points of view. So, although we often discern political messages 
in individual films, they are rarely presented as discrete argumentative positions.
It might be better, then, to think of the place of spoken rhetoric in filmic story-
telling as bound up with the wider politics of cinema – that is, with cinema’s dis-
tinctive techniques of drawing in, sustaining, and satisfying the attention of the 
spectator. Moments of oratory – if present at all – are usually a response to the 
given constraints of a fictive situation that calls forth problem-solving, explana-
tion, or action. Films are usually dramatic presentations of fictional situations, as-
semblages of audio and visual material into a formal unity, of which speech (and 
other types of ) performance is a function. They usually depict dynamic scenarios 
in which characters are charged with identifying and resolving problems. Any 
moral or philosophical argument is by necessity linked to this wider “entertain-
ment” goal, which generates dramatic tensions where characters emerge as agents 
with the appropriate subjective resources to resolve those tensions. Moreover, 
where decisive moments of speech do occur, they supplement what is a primarily 
visual narrative. In short, speech is part of what we see.
In this article I want to expand upon the idea of films as the staging of situa-
tions in order to think about the rhetorical organization of subjectivity at work in 
cinema (understood as the wider framework of choices by which films are made). 
For in depicting fictional circumstances in which a rhetorical opportunity arrives, 
films make explicit what is often obscured in regular political encounters: namely, 
the role of desire in rhetorical action. The cinematic presentation of an exigence 
can be said to open a gap in the symbolic world, distorting the visual field in a 
way that provokes our interest. In Lacanian psychoanalytic film theory this dis-
tortion is named “the gaze”, which describes an absence in the spectator’s field of 
vision that instantiates a traumatic encounter with the “Real”, or the collapse of 
symbolic meaning altogether. Film deploys this gaze in various ways in order to 
incite the desire of the spectator around the prospect of revealing the secret of the 
Other’s “enjoyment”. That is, the gaze holds out the possibility of knowing the 
true source of social authority’s desire behind its symbolic façade. The cinematic 
exigence thereby places the spectator’s desire inside the film narrative, so that it 
can then be coordinated by speech and action. This visual lure invites us to think 
about how political rhetoric, more generally, operates on a visual register.
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To explore all this, I turn first to the idea that film offers up a form of dra-
matic visual argument that maps out the path to a tentative form of subjec-
tivity. I then set out the Lacanian inspired film theory, just mentioned, which 
suggests, moreover, that the politics of cinema begins in evoking a loss of sub-
jectivity to which it then may offer, via the speech moment, a fantasmatic 
resolution. To clarify my argument, I will use the example of two recent films 
about that great figure of rhetorical agency, Winston Churchill. I end by mak-
ing some brief suggestive comments about the visuality of political rhetoric.
2. Rhetoric, Subjectivity and the Politics of Cinema
Part of the attraction of films is their ability to endow characters with unique, 
enigmatic qualities, typically revealed in their confrontation with intense and 
improbable circumstances. Out of these circumstances frequently arise memo-
rable rhetorical moments when something is said that does more than sim-
ply continue the dialogue but, instead, announces a turn in the plot itself 
(see Yorke, 2013). Think, for example, of Darth Vader’s shocking revelation to 
Luke Skywalker in The Empire Strikes Back (1980, dir. Irvin Kershner): “No, 
I am your father”. It is from such moments that characters come to external-
ise their new understanding of the qualities required to resolve tensions in the 
plot. Often it is a moment of self-awareness, or a key disclosure, that clarifies 
the situation and the relation of key characters to it. Sometimes it is a delibera-
tion between a number of characters that reaches a climax, for example in the 
courtroom drama (such as 12 Angry Men (1957, dir. Sidney Lumet) or A Few 
Good Men (1992, dir. Aaron Sorkin)). In other genres, it might be a final, re-
vealing exposition, such as we find in detective movies.
Rhetorical moments of this variety are often momentary – but decisive – turn-
ing points that register stages in the process of cause and effect that fictional nar-
ratives depict (see Bordwell and Thompson, 1993: 68–74). Although “natural” 
dialogue may litter the drama with numerous conversations, rhetorical moments 
(and there may be several) stand out as interventions that propel the story in a spe-
cific direction and cue us to anticipate some part of the overall message or mean-
ing of the film. As a consequence, films deliberately supply famous turns of phrase 
rather than lengthy speeches. These are designed to articulate in condensed fash-
ion the central conflict of the drama. Such “take-away” phrases encapsulate charac-
ter attitudes or qualities as verbal motifs that audiences enjoy and go on to repeat.
It seems, then, that rhetorical moments form part of the larger assemblage that 
make up a movie. Moreover, they provide a means for spectators to invest emotion-
ally in the narrative and perhaps to identify with its major characters. But this is to 
suggest that dramatic speech gains its force less from its own linguistic content and 
more from a dynamic within the form of cinema film itself. Much depends here, 
then, on what we think that dynamic is and how it acts upon the spectator.
REDE 21_1 copy.indd   9 10/05/2019   8.33
IP: 130.88.157.111 On: Thu, 18 Jul 2019 09:02:17
Delivered by Ingenta
10
James Martin: Seeing Voices
In the film theory of the 1960s and 70s, it was common to argue that most 
mainstream cinema was subservient to a dominant ideology. The spectator’s iden-
tification with a film enabled accepted beliefs and values to be uncritically affirmed 
and thus commercial cinema could be argued to contribute to wider societal dom-
ination. Movies have always attracted considerable interest from governments, po-
litical parties or politicians who are drawn to (and threatened by) their capacity 
to sustain images of society, history or moral values (see Giglio, 2010). But how is 
this ideological function achieved? Film theorists argued that in a capitalist society 
forms of “mass” entertainment such as cinema undertake the role of “ideologi-
cal apparatuses”. In the wake of philosopher Louis Althusser’s structuralist refash-
ioning of Marxism, radical theorists of film drew upon the idea that mainstream 
cinema – the enormous industry of imagining and producing films, particularly 
of the Hollywood variety – was a cultural apparatus that produced ideologically 
conforming subjects (see, for example, Baudry, 1985; Heath, 1981). Cinema’s for-
mal techniques and modes of operation assembled films whose content masked 
the contradictions of capitalism and promised a “false” resolution to the dramatic 
narratives they depicted, enabling an illusion of subjective mastery by offering the 
viewer a misleading sense of “seeing and knowing everything”. The medium of 
this ideological effect lay, for example, in techniques such as “continuity editing”, 
which secures the illusion that events unfold sequentially in real time and lends 
an appearance of uninterrupted “everyday reality” to drama; the use of archetypal 
characters – often white, middle class and aspirational figures rather than the poor 
and excluded; and the reiteration of narrative resolutions in which conventionally-
held universal principles – true love, justice, moral righteousness over evil, and so 
on – are declared supreme. Together these techniques encouraged mass viewers 
subjectively to identify with plots, characters and values that aligned them to con-
servative norms to which they were uncritically held captive.
From this perspective – which as Rushton (2013: 4) suggests held for most radi-
cal critics and not simply Marxists – any rhetorical moment is continuous with 
the wider ideological function of creating a false subjectivity, both in the film and 
among its spectators. The film is an illusory representation of reality and viewers are 
effortlessly drawn into identifying with its dramatic elements, thereby securing their 
compliance with the “hegemonic” norms and values that sustain capitalism, patri-
archy, racism, and so on (see, for example, Mulvey, 2009; Heath, 1981). Political 
critique thus “becomes a matter of administering a scorecard of ideology” (Rushton, 
2013: 74) to gauge how successful such representations are. What is lacking in such 
films was felt to be a measure of what Brecht conceived as critical “distance” from 
the glossy and unthought assumptions that guide the cinematic image (Rushton, 
2013: 45–9). For radical film critics, the proper cinematic antidote to subjective as-
similation is, consequently, to sustain an “alienating” effect that dislocates the spec-
tator’s conventional point of view, refuses full mastery to its knowledge and vision, 
and confounds conservative expectations of resolution and universality (see Clayton 
and Mulvey, 2017). While such a critical distance from hegemonic norms may be 
achieved in “experimental” films – by, for example, Jean-Luc Godard – Rushton 
notes these deliberatively alienating films are often hard to watch.
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Indeed, for Rushton the problem with film theory of this variety is simply its 
effort to “escape subjectivity”. That is, all positive representation in film is taken 
to entail a process of fixing the spectator’s subjective awareness into determinate 
parameters that refuse the contradictory reality of oppressive society. Thus, the 
only way to evade capture is to defy the comforting appeal that inclines audiences 
to align with false images. By contrast, Rushton suggests we might treat subjectiv-
ity in film not as a form of capture but, rather, as an achievement whose path to 
realisation is depicted in narrative form. A narrative typically presents a situation 
in which some element undergoes transformation over time as the consequence 
of causes that are either displayed or inferred. Fictional narratives, particular-
ly those of contemporary film, present this transformation from the subjective 
point of view of characters whose motivations and perceptions are themselves 
both its cause and consequence (see Branigan, 1992). Drawing upon the work of 
Robert Pippin and Stanley Cavell, Rushton argues that many mainstream films 
supply narratives in which spectators follow the gradual emergence of a new sense 
of subjectivity by characters, frequently one in which an awareness of occupying 
a shared space with others comes to be recognised as liberating (Rushton, 2013: 
10–30). Here it is precisely the fictive (rather than realistic) nature of the narra-
tive that allows us to focus on how characters psychologically learn and develop 
through the plot, eventually coming to open realisation that they can only be free 
if they become different kinds of subject. But this is not a freedom from structure 
or convention as such, as radical film theory claimed, but freedom understood 
as dependence on others (Rushton, 2013: 23, 31–2). In that way, for Rushton, 
cinema films present us with arguments elaborated in melodramatic form, where 
characters exemplify personal struggles and choices as they learn to become new 
subjects alongside others (Rushton presents the much derided The Sound of Music 
(1965, dir. Robert Wise) as a case study in this respect. See 2013: 73–8). Here, 
he argues – and not in some effort to represent the contradictions of a non-cine-
matic “reality”– lies a genuine democratic politics of film.
Rushton’s critique of “political modernism” in film theory encourages us to 
conceive rhetorical moments in cinema as part of a potentially emancipatory 
process of re-forming (rather than uncritically fixing) subjectivity. This is a 
process that cannot be aligned simply with bourgeois ideology. Indeed, it helps 
explain why certain examples of cinematic speech are experienced by audienc-
es as profound statements of liberation: by externalising a subjective attitude 
through which they identify and imagine their own independence.
Hollywood films regularly supply emancipatory narratives in which different 
positions contest a situation and then key characters come to realise the urgency 
of transforming their attitudes in order to liberate themselves from its constraints, 
with rhetorical moments encapsulating stages of self-realisation in this process. 
These are moments in which new subjectivities (and, in Rushton’s view, public and 
therefore potentially democratic positions) come into view. Aspirations for libera-
tion and self-transformation are therefore not reducible to the trivial fictions of 
bourgeois ideology but can be expressive of an emergent subjectivity where specta-
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tors follow one or more characters’ eventual realisation that to defeat their personal 
alienation they have to adjust themselves positively to being with others. This, for 
example, is what occurs in President Whitmore’s pre-battle speech in the Sci-Fi ac-
tion film, Independence Day (1996, dir. Roland Emmerich), a “classical” oration 
that assembles the recognised tropes of a rousing ceremonial speech proclaiming 
the virtues of a common struggle for freedom, culminating in triumphant music 
and vocal acclamation from his audience. As Rushton points out, the pleasures of 
cinematic productions are integral to the narrative depiction of becoming a subject 
with others, however absurd they must seem when held up to “reality” (Ruston, 
2013: 78). Other people’s dreams and aspirations, articulated in such moments, 
give voice to a potent democratic sentiment concerned with escaping the restric-
tions of fixed and isolated identities and, instead, coming together. Unlike the 
political modernism of film theory, then, Rushton rejects the view that pleasure is 
something that captures us and tightly conditions our subjectivity. Rather, it ena-
bles spectators to affirm the prospect of discovering a new subjectivity altogether 
–  and it is here, he implies, that a distinctly cinematic politics inheres.
3. The Cinematic Gaze
Rushton helps explain how an argumentative stance might be elaborated in film 
not in the form of a single speech but as a story about the subjective development 
of characters, at least in certain films. But he neglects to explore closely one of the 
important conditions noted by rhetorical theorists for making an argument plau-
sible: the “exigence”. In Lloyd Bitzer’s famous account, the rhetorical exigence is 
the pressing dilemma or problem that demands resolution and thereby generates 
an urgency to which an argument aims to respond (see Bitzer, 1968). In non-cin-
ematic conditions the exigence is typically a crisis, policy failure or unforeseen dis-
ruption to the usual sequence of events that generates the symbolic gap that rheto-
ric seeks to occupy. In a film narrative, we might initially regard this exigence as 
part of the opening scenario, where a disruption to normality initiates the unfold-
ing of the narrative (for example: the heist, a murder, or the irrupting volcano). 
The plot, like a rhetorical exigence, presents causes and constraints arising from 
this disruption in light of which leading characters are required to confront various 
obstacles that reveal different opportunities and choices, eventually offering up a 
resolution. But in cinema the exigence is not just for the fictional characters; it also 
works upon the audience to draw them into the narrative and invest in the film.
Although Rushton is critical of psychoanalytical film theory (especially the 
work of Žižek) for its part in the political modernism he criticises, it is difficult 
to understand the ways movies work without inciting and sustaining the desire of 
the spectator (see Lebeau, 2001). For psychoanalytic theory, “desire” describes the 
unconscious motivation that propels subjects from object to object in search of a 
satisfaction that constantly evades them. Importantly, desire is not exhausted in 
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a conscious awareness of “need” or a specific goal but, rather, is driven by some-
thing “obscene” that is refused access to consciousness. We cannot be aware of 
what motivates us unconsciously, though we may feel its force indirectly in how 
we are attracted to certain, sometimes unacceptable, objects. Desire operates fun-
damentally as an underlying urge for an indeterminate “something”, a “lost ob-
ject” of which we find only traces in the actual objects we come across, but which 
never itself fully appears. While many things give us pleasure – a passing gratifica-
tion that is usually acceptable to society – our desires are, at their root, motivated 
by the drive towards a satisfaction beyond mere pleasure. This is what Jacques 
Lacan called jouissance or “enjoyment” – a strangely alluring orientation to self-
obliteration that excites and frightens us at the same time (Braunstein, 2003). We 
can never realise this (not without destroying ourselves) but are profoundly at-
tracted to it nonetheless. Indeed, the pursuit of our desires is itself strangely satis-
fying, precisely because it sustains us in a condition of frustrated anticipation that 
approximates the enjoyment we feel we have lost (see McGowan, 2013).
For Todd McGowan (2007), it is the arousal and sustenance of this desire 
that attracts people to cinema films. Like Freud’s account of dreams, he argues 
that films arouse our desires not by giving us what we want but, rather, by con-
stantly creating obstacles to their realisation. Our desire properly exists only 
as an unrealised longing, not as a realised satisfaction. Both dreams and films 
therefore dwell primarily on the failure to achieve satisfaction; they devote most 
of their content to depicting obstacles to the goal sought, thereby satisfying de-
sire simply as desire. This suggests that the argumentative process that Rushton 
explores emerges only by recruiting spectators through the activation and suste-
nance of their desire. The explicit exigence that drives a film to resolution works 
not just by presenting a fictional scenario but by constantly making spectators 
invest psychically in the gaps it opens. As film theorist, Elizabeth Cowie, puts 
it: “The pleasure of representation lies not only in what is signified – a mean-
ing – in the traditional, realist, sense, that is, a coming to know; it also lies in a 
coming to desire made possible by the scenario of desire which I come to par-
ticipate in as I watch a film, view an image, or read a text” (Cowie, 1997: 4).
How does this “coming to desire” work? For McGowan, we can think of the 
subjective attraction of cinema in terms of what Lacan called “the gaze” (see 
Lacan, 1977: 67–90). In film theory the gaze is often mistakenly associated 
with the spectator’s own view of a movie. Like Rushton, McGowan is critical 
of the claim in radical film theory that the viewer is promised some kind of il-
lusory visual mastery. Paradoxically, this claim was made by way of psychoana-
lytic theory, relying on Lacan’s idea of the “imaginary” as a false sense of unity 
and integrity that conjoins the viewer to bourgeois ideology. But for McGow-
an, that interpretation fundamentally misunderstands Lacan’s theory of the 
gaze, which is not about the viewer’s subjective mastery but, rather, about its 
submission (McGowan, 2007: 8–12).
The gaze in Lacan refers not to what the spectator sees but, instead, to some-
thing the spectator assumes is watching it. This is not a subjective “look” but an 
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objective experience of being “looked at” from somewhere in the film. That is 
to say, the spectator is drawn to the film by way of something that it cannot see, 
some indeterminate presence that distorts its view of what it can see, and makes 
the spectator ask what it wants. The gaze in Lacan’s work is a formulation of 
what he calls the “objet petit a”, a dimension of “the Real” – that is, the unsym-
bolisable, excessive impulses refused access to consciousness – that arouses the 
desire of the subject; it presents itself as something that seems to be “in” the im-
age but cannot be positively identified. The objet petit a designates that aspect of 
the Other (an authoritative point of reference in the symbolic world) that evades 
our grasp but seems to call up our desire – like the mysterious qualities of “na-
tional” identity in social traditions, the ineffable but “adorable” quality in a loved 
one, or the intense promise of fulfilment offered by the acquisition of riches. It 
is an indeterminate quality that is “in an object more than the object itself ” (see 
Lacan, 1977: 268) – what gives ordinary objects a fleeting but viscerally intense 
appeal beyond their symbolic meanings. The gaze names the peculiarly visual 
form of this dimension that incites our desire, even though (and indeed because) 
it cannot actually be seen. For Lacan, the objet petit a stands for the prospect of 
enjoyment that forever evades our grasp. We are drawn to it because we uncon-
sciously feel we lack it and that if we can have it, or know what it is, we might 
enjoy it too (Lacan, 1977: 77). This, however, is not a promise of mastery but an 
invitation to submission, to surrender ourselves to a much deeper satisfaction.
In McGowan’s argument, it is the lure of enjoyment that pulls us into cinematic 
films. Because films can show us more than ordinary reality – that is, they present 
a visual abundance that can take us into parts of the world we normally cannot 
see – they promise insights into the secret working of things. The gaze is deployed 
in movies to arouse our desire by stimulating a visual uncertainty around which 
characters and plots develop. As Joan Copjec (1994: 35) puts it: “The subject is the 
effect of the impossibility of seeing what is lacking in the representation, what the 
subject, therefore, wants to see”. It is the attacker we cannot identify, the monster 
that has no proper form, the enemy whose purposes we don’t yet understand, and 
so on. In each case it is what we cannot see in the image, something that “stains” its 
transparency, that raises our investment in it (Lacan, 1977: 74). That investment 
revolves around the unconsciously posed question of what the character – the en-
emy, the monster, or the Other – “enjoys”. The cinematic gaze is thus organised 
around the erotic possibility of revealing a secret enjoyment beneath the surface of 
the symbolic order. This is why films hold off for some time answering this ques-
tion so that the spectator’s desire can be recruited.
Now films rarely work by sustaining the gaze throughout the narrative. The 
film usually offers clues or answers to the question raised by its distortion. For 
McGowan, this is where desire meets “fantasy”. For it is fantasy, in Lacan’s sense 
of the term, that supplies an answer to the question of the gaze. Fantasy is com-
monly understood as an unrealistic or fantastical world. But, in Lacan, it refers to 
the way the gaps in the everyday experience of symbolic order are covered over or 
explained away in order to give some consistency to our experiences. Fantasy sup-
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plies an image of harmony or smooth normality rather than unreality. It depicts a 
scenario through which we come to know the source of the gaze and the object of 
the Other’s enjoyment. That way, we evade the traumatic encounter with the Real 
that otherwise upsets our vision of the world. In concrete politics, fantasy typi-
cally involves locating the true object that is enjoyed against our will (unearned 
welfare for the immigrant, wealth for the greedy banker, or power and control 
for the heartless and self-interested bourgeoisie). The obstacles to our desires thus 
turn out, it seems, not to be psychical in origin but actually, empirically resolv-
able, once we unmask the secret enjoyment of our adversary (see McGowan, 
2007: 16; 2013: 31–9). In film, fantasy is similarly the presentation of a scenario 
in which the enigmatic lure of the Other’s enjoyment is resolved by overcoming 
obstacles – for example, in finding romance by acknowledging a secret love, de-
feating the enemy by discovering the treasure it really wants, killing the monster 
by working out its intrinsic weakness. Having discovered the actual nature of the 
Other’s obscure enjoyment, its subversive attraction as an unknowable dimension 
dissipates, our desires recede and a pleasurable outcome is achieved as “normal-
ity” (that is, the restoration of the symbolic order) is allowed to return.
For McGowan, it is the articulation of the gaze with fantasy that is important 
in distinguishing the different ways that film narratives operate: “The way in 
which a film deploys the gaze is, I would argue, the fundamental, political and 
existential act of the cinema” (2007: 18). Film is the site of a struggle between 
the disruptive possibilities of the gaze and the effect these might have on how 
common fantasies of social order are imagined. There are, he continues, various 
ways that our desire can be recruited and aligned (or not) to fantasy scenarios. 
McGowan identifies four: the gaze might be deployed to disrupt known fantasy 
scenarios, revealing that “reality” is itself founded upon excessive enjoyment; 
sometimes, films sustain the gaze as an uncertainty that haunts the story but 
refuses easy resolution; or, as is most common, films deploy the gaze only to re-
solve it into restoring the fantasy of a harmonious reality; finally, films might re-
fuse fantasy altogether and simply sustain a gaze without any fantasmatic resolu-
tion (McGowan, 2007: 18–20). The true “politics of cinema”, he argues, lies not 
in the fantasy element of the resolution but how the fantasy is related to the gaze.
McGowan’s account of the cinematic gaze offers us a way to connect narrative, 
subjectivity and rhetoric in film that differs significantly from Rushton’s approach. 
His point is not merely that film narratives manipulate or withhold certain details 
of the plot until the end so as to keep audiences in suspense. Rather, he argues that 
narratives present a concealment that is fundamental to subjectivity and that can 
never actually be revealed. The gaze describes “the absent object that constitutes 
the field of representation itself” (McGowan, 2007: 74) and we should not mis-
take this for any positive object (such as friendship, self-awareness, or the defeat 
of an enemy) that a narrative might reveal at its close. Nonetheless, he underlines, 
“desire is inextricably linked to narrative structure” (2007: 72) because narratives 
present spectators with absences in their knowledge that, in triggering a desire to 
know the secret of the Other’s enjoyment, destabilise subjective closure. The im-
REDE 21_1 copy.indd   15 10/05/2019   8.33
IP: 130.88.157.111 On: Thu, 18 Jul 2019 09:02:17
Delivered by Ingenta
16
James Martin: Seeing Voices
portant rhetorical manoeuvre here lies not in how films realise the pleasure of a 
liberated subjectivity but how effectively they manage the cinematic exigence that 
encourages spectators momentarily to withhold their stance towards symbolic “re-
ality”. We might say that all cinema movies undertake an argument within them-
selves; that is, they set up an internal dispute – between what they show and how 
they manage what they cannot show – that is fought out via the subjectivity of the 
spectator. And it is within this argumentative space in cinema’s visual form that we 
might discern its relation to rhetoric.
4. Watching the Leader Speak: Darkest Hour and Churchill
I now want to illustrate the relation between the gaze, fantasy and rhetoric in 
relation to two recent films exploring the war leadership of Winston Churchill: 
Darkest Hour (2017, dir. Joe Wright) and Churchill (2017, dir. Jonathan Teplitz-
ky). These are not exhaustive of every issue raised above but they do relate to the 
depiction of political rhetoric. Each film narrates a brief, yet decisive, moment 
of Churchill’s premiership during the Second World War: Darkest Hour focuses 
on his arrival as Prime Minister in Summer 1940 and Churchill on his role in 
the decision to launch “Operation Overlord” in 1944. Each is therefore con-
cerned with his leadership at key moments in the war effort; and each deploys 
Churchill’s famous, defiant oratory as emblems of his leadership qualities. Dark-
est Hour opens with his “Blood, Toil, Tears and Sweat” speech to the Commons 
on 13 May and closes on his “We Shall Fight on the Beaches” speech in the same 
venue of 4 June. Churchill, on the other hand, presents just one, fictional radio 
broadcast at the film’s close. Nonetheless, whereas Darkest Hour employs the 
cinematic gaze only to resolve it in a classic fantasy of heroism announced by his 
final speech, Churchill presents a more ambivalent case by sustaining the gaze, so 
displacing (if not entirely dispensing with) the fantasy narrative.
It is clear why Winston Churchill might be an appealing figure for dramatic 
treatment in cinema. His war time leadership was arguably decisive in resisting 
the advance of Nazism across Europe and his speeches have become definitive 
statements of moral defiance in the face of the fascist threat. Churchill’s intran-
sigent spirit on this occasion, his distinctive gruff voice and widely recognised 
image as a stocky, cigar smoking, victory-v gesturing figure have been iconic in 
the post-war world. In many ways, Churchill has become a cultural motif for 
popular sovereignty in the UK, projecting an “island” mentality and invincible 
faith in the autonomy and integrity of the British union. This cultural appro-
priation is, not surprisingly, somewhat at odds with the known facts. Churchill 
was widely held in suspicion by his party colleagues (he was once a liberal and 
was part American), his speeches were not uniformly or universally admired at 
the time (see Toye, 2013), and after the war he supported the end of the British 
Empire and the pooling of sovereignty in the emerging European community. 
Nonetheless, for all its distortions the cultural imagination has made the figure 
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of Winston Churchill a constant point of reference for fantasies of leadership 
and national “spirit”.
Churchill’s place as an imaginary figure of authority readily lends itself to dra-
matic treatment. His speeches, in particular, have helped to tell a wartime story of 
national gravity, noble resistance, and solemn duty. These have contributed to a 
mythical (and often highly selective and hence misleading) post-war narrative of a 
steadfast British character that has fed into the rhetoric of other post-war leaders, 
such as Margaret Thatcher. Yet all the actual wartime fighting was done by others 
and elsewhere. His speeches might serve as a useful narrative overlay on images of 
combat, but what can they tell us of Churchill? What is interesting about these 
films is that they employ his speeches and his fame as a rouser of other people’s 
emotions as part of a story about the man himself and his own struggles to become 
the leader we have since taken him to be. Because cinema allows us to look “be-
hind the scenes”, to see the truth beneath the fantasy, the focus of the two films is 
on revealing how Churchill comes to take up the subjectivity of leadership. These 
are not “biopics” telling us a story on the grand scale about Churchill’s life and ca-
reer, but snapshots in a timeline with which we often presume ourselves familiar. 
We know Churchill was a great leader but how did he get to be so? Where, in the 
extreme jeopardy of wartime government, did he find the qualities to stamp his 
own mark on events? In short, what was the nature of Churchill’s secret enjoyment 
and how did he find it? Both films deploy the gaze to ask this question of his lead-
ership role and both rely on fantasy to answer it, though perhaps in different ways.
Darkest Hour deploys its gaze around the question of Churchill’s leadership 
in the early, uncertain steps of the war. It constructs this question through his 
relationship to other members of his war cabinet (notably Lord Halifax and 
Neville Chamberlain) and their preferred option of opening negotiations with 
the advancing Nazis, rather than confronting them. The film dwells on the ob-
stacles those figures presented to Churchill’s determination to resist Nazism. It 
allows us to see the secret doubts that many had about Churchill’s capacity to 
lead effectively: he is distrusted by eminent Conservatives, the King, the House 
of Commons, and ultimately by himself. Churchill’s American family, his readi-
ness to cross the benches from the Liberals, and his past inglorious history in the 
Gallipoli campaign in World War One are all offered as evidence of uncertainty 
about his general character. Indeed, it is this narrow, elite frame of reference that 
helps focus the gaze on what it is that motivates Churchill as a political leader. 
We are constantly in doubt as to the source of his inspiration, a doubt that is fre-
quently depicted by the presence of sharp, blinding beams of light through cur-
tains and in the Commons chamber that Churchill constantly evades. The light 
gestures a threatening encounter with the Real, a laser-like shaft that plunges eve-
rything around it into dark and obliterates clarity of vision. Much of the film’s 
dialogue and movement therefore occurs in the semi-darkness of enclosed rooms 
and halls, bunkers and tube train tunnels – all markers of the isolation and laby-
rinthine confusion of political decision-making in war time circumstances. This 
visual blockage is a figuration of the objet petit a – the “blind spot” in our vision 
REDE 21_1 copy.indd   17 10/05/2019   8.33
IP: 130.88.157.111 On: Thu, 18 Jul 2019 09:02:17
Delivered by Ingenta
18
James Martin: Seeing Voices
that distorts our view of Churchill as a leader by simply withdrawing him from 
clear view. That lack of clarity is reinforced by Churchill’s own statements about 
not knowing his own mind, how “the right words won’t come”.
But Churchill eventually overcomes his self-doubt. We finally reach a fan-
tasmatic resolution which permits us to discover Churchill’s true enjoyment. 
In a series of meetings, first with the King (who tells him to go to “the peo-
ple”) and secondly, in a most improbable sequence, with ordinary Londoners 
in an underground tube train where Churchill learns of the true determination 
and steadfast spirit of resistance of normal citizens. Asking the people for their 
views on whether or not to negotiate with Hitler, they respond with revulsion 
and assertions of “never”! Churchill appears to find the mettle he was looking 
for and, with renewed resolve gained from his exchanges with the King and the 
people, he makes a statement to the Commons, declaring that “we will fight 
them on the beaches”. The cinematic gaze is thus resolved by the heroic figure 
stepping in to the light to deliver the declaration of defiance at the dispatch 
box for which he subsequently became famous. The Commons roars its ap-
proval and even the Conservative benches rally to Churchill’s speech.
Churchill, on the other hand, takes its point of departure not from the ar-
rival on the scene of our hero but, conversely, from his increasingly diminished 
status as the war approaches its final, decisive stages. The figure of Churchill 
depicted in this independent film is similarly required to make a decision yet 
now he is not about to come into the light but, rather, to stand on the margins. 
Indeed, the motif of beaches is employed throughout the film as a signal of his 
tragic, Lear-like marginality. The war effort is at this point dominated by the 
US, the “war in the sky” has been won, and the allies are readying for the final 
but destructive confrontations on land. Churchill struggles in this film not to 
find a way to lead but, instead, to commit himself to a way to end the war. The 
explicit obstacles depicted in the movie are with the military commanders – 
led by the US General Eisenhower – rather than political rivals. But Church-
ill’s indecision this time revolves around his personal struggles in accepting the 
necessity of the land war; he is haunted by the memory of World War One and 
the tremendous loss of life in the Gallipoli campaign. The imagery of blood in 
the tide water, the battlefield scene in his mind, his frequent references to the 
lives lost thirty years before, his lingering refusal to accept the decision-making 
of the military, and his eventual bout of depression, make Churchill seem a fig-
ure hopelessly lost in his past. Tormented by the memory of “so much waste” 
he is unable to find the spirit to commit himself to a new confrontation.
The gaze in this account is more a psychological one than in Darkest Hour. Un-
like the darkness of the latter, Churchill is often bathed in light. Many scenes are 
shot outside in the bright countryside. Whereas the Churchill of Darkest Hour 
is an appealing, soft-skinned and round-faced man (played by Gary Oldman, 
who won a Best Actor Oscar in 2018), that of Churchill (played by Brian Cox) 
is an exhausted, frail and corpulent figure. His attire marks him out as a man of 
the previous century (especially the opening scenes where he dresses to meet the 
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military commanders). Churchill’s reputation as a once rousing speaker is fre-
quently mentioned with irony; his current abilities dismissed by military figures 
as “doubt, dithering and treachery”. His hastily agreed plans to lead the D-Day 
landings in a separate ship alongside the King are ill thought-through signs of 
desperation. This forlorn figure is not the emergent saviour of Darkest Hour but 
a man in decline who has lost his capacity for incisive judgement and cannot act 
“like a hero” as his wife, Clemmy, exhorts. In this account the gaze works not to 
prepare a fantasy resolution but to undermine the fantasy of the great leader. Our 
view of the hero is not characterised by darkness so much as excess – we see too 
much of Churchill lost in bleak thoughts, barking furiously when he cannot fo-
cus, anxiously recalling the past, repeating his fears and refusals, and eventually 
prostrate on his bed unable to communicate. These images contrast with the de-
cisive, chiselled featured and uniformed figures of military command with whom 
he clashes. This Churchill cannot find the source of his enjoyment and the length 
of his indecision threatens to make the film a rather frustrating experience.
But, once more, the fantasy is eventually restored, at least partially. Again, 
Churchill’s mettle is recovered following an intimate conversation with the King 
and, this time, a moment of revelation from his female secretary. The King re-
minds him of the necessity simply to “exist” rather than seek a “thrill”. And his 
secretary reminds him of his public image as “the bravest man in history” as well as 
her wish to believe in a future. Churchill’s job, she reminds him, is to give people 
like her some “hope”. Enjoyment is thus to be found in adherence to duty not in 
the transmission of popular feeling as in Darkest Hour. These sympathetic urgings 
lift Churchill from his dark mood and bring him to rediscover his sense of duty, 
whatever the cost. He then sets off to write his speech for a radio broadcast, which 
he delivers with confidence, saying “We shall never surrender. I shall never surren-
der ...”. The heroic image seems restored but, in the few silent moments following 
his broadcast, Churchill sips his whisky and gestures his satisfaction as if to suggest 
that what he really enjoys is his reward for a dutiful performance. This implies a re-
maining gap between the actual figure and the fantasy orator that the narrative re-
fuses to resolve, permitting us to witness in this moment of secret enjoyment how 
Churchill does not quite coincide with his mythical image as the heroic war leader.
Both films, then, deploy the gaze as a visual exigence to open up the question 
of the leader’s enjoyment, thereby activating the audience’s desire and, conse-
quently, its investment in the narrative. Both also offer an answer to this question 
in the form of a fantasmatic resolution expressed, in each instance, as Churchill 
“finding his voice” so that he can occupy the place of the authorial father fig-
ure with conviction. These are not unfamiliar steps in historical film dramas – a 
similar problem of a leader without a voice is found, for example, in The King’s 
Speech (2010, dir. Tom Hooper) – which serve a rather conservative ideology that 
eventually reinforces an image of paternal control. In the two films examined, the 
closing oratorical moment is a demonstration of the personal victory of the hero 
over his opponents and, of course, his own demons. The final speeches herald 
the apparent coincidence of Churchill with himself: in Rushton’s terms, he has 
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demonstrated that he has become a subject (though not quite in the “democrat-
ic” sense that Rushton explores). But if the eventual achievement of Churchill’s 
subjectivity is the final reward of each film, the audience’s enjoyment arguably 
derives from the blockage of its desire rather than its realisation. The set-piece 
oratory we actually witness is the signal that the drama – and hence our invest-
ment – is over. Nonetheless, the speech at the end of Darkest Hour ensures the 
narrative closes on a rhetoric of acclamation (or acclamatio) that uncritically af-
firms Churchill’s achievement of his leadership (see Lanham, 1991: 1), whereas 
the speech moment near the end of Churchill sustains a rhetoric of doubt (or apo-
ria) whereby we remain uncertain of his true disposition (see Lanham, 1991: 19).
If the general narrative components of the films are similar, then, the manner 
in which the gaze operates in each film is different. Darkest Hour has us believe 
that Churchill’s obstacles are largely political and he needs to find a new source 
for his conviction, which he discovers in the wisdom of ordinary people. Church-
ill, by contrast, plays on the wartime Prime Minister’s obsolescence and his need 
simply to offer “hope” by taking up his symbolic role. The closing images of 
his radio broadcast and the final shots of him on the beach raising (and losing) 
his hat to those fighting across the Channel suggest that the fantasy of the war 
leader is precisely that. Not surprisingly, the first film was a financial and artistic 
success, perhaps because it reactivated a mythology with which many audiences 
were already familiar, while the second was more controversial and brought criti-
cism of an absence of “realism” (see Roberts, 2017). These contrasting reactions 
seem to mirror the films’ different narratives: whereas Darkest Hour neutralises 
the gaze by restoring the fantasy of the leader that is commonly felt to be “real”, 
Churchill deploys the gaze so as to question, if only in part, that image.
5. Conclusion: Visualising the Political Stain
Cinema enables us to understand how rhetoric relates to desire. In this article 
I have tried to demonstrate the point not by dwelling on the technicalities of 
speech but, rather, on the way subjectivity is given visual organisation in film. 
The Lacanian theory of the gaze – the deployment of a distortion in the visual 
field that attracts our interest in the Other’s enjoyment – permits us to conceive 
rhetorical moments as elements of a cinematic politics of activating desire and 
relating it anew to the fantasies that support our perception of symbolic reality. 
Importantly, desire and fantasy are not the same thing: desire is the manifesta-
tion of a libidinal sense of lost enjoyment that is opened up by a disruption to the 
symbolic order; fantasy, however, is a way of organising that desire and reinvest-
ing it in particular objects (such as individual characters and their goals), thereby 
reducing the discomforts of desire. The incitement of desire therefore need not be 
uncritical of fantasy nor entirely a means to support ideology, as radical film theo-
rists once assumed. Instead, it provokes spectators to raise the question of what, if 
anything, gives consistency to reality and the authority on which it is claimed to 
rest. In that way, the cinematic exigence momentarily subverts our acceptance of 
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symbolic authority and its fantasmatic support, thereby offering an opportunity 
to adjust our attitude towards authority. In film, spoken rhetorical moments may 
work in a number of ways in this respect: to activate desire, to question fantasy, 
or to reinvest it. In the two Churchill movies examined, it serves to restore to us 
the mythical figure we already think we know – but not without a significant di-
vergence in how we relate to the fantasy that supports that assumption.
Regular political speech is not quite the same as the cinematic variety. As 
part of the routinised exchanges of public culture, it tends to presuppose the 
solidity of the symbolic order with which it engages. In democratic cultures 
especially, this solidity commonly enables a robust, “deliberative” rhetoric cen-
tred on disputing what it is that public authorities should do. Cinematic rheto-
ric, on the other hand – especially in the fictional dramas of mainstream film 
– is dominated by character-led narratives where everything hangs on personal 
qualities and choices. That inclines movies to an “epideictic” rhetoric in which 
spectators are invited, ultimately, to allocate praise or blame to characters, as 
we saw in the example of the Churchill movies (see Lanham, 1991: 164).
Nonetheless we might consider that political speech shares a similar interest 
to cinema in seeking to refigure or revitalise the public’s libidinal connection to 
the social order. To do this, speakers must on occasion directly incite desire by 
drawing attention to threatened or actual disruptions to our image of social real-
ity. In that respect, political rhetoric can also be visual in character, alerting us to 
the distorting presence of “stains” on the political horizon that prevent us from 
seeing government, or ourselves, properly. Political speeches rely substantially on 
contingent irruptions of scandal, crisis, or venality to capture our attention and, 
by then narrativizing our perception of the situation, activate our desire for reso-
lution. While resolution may come in the form of fantasies incarnated via new 
policy programmes, different leadership, or visions of a new society altogether, 
the root of our initial investment lies, as our discussion of cinema suggests, in the 
distorting presence of the stain that raises the question of what the Other enjoys. 
Alongside the alternating positions of deliberative oratory, typically found in 
parliaments and assemblies when they deal with identifiable problems and solu-
tions, we also find narratives that dwell on what can’t be seen – and so can only 
be inferred – about the motivations of social and political actors. Our psychi-
cal investment in practical answers, policies, or political figures is enhanced by 
this distortion in the visual field that disrupts an assumed condition of transpar-
ency. Political rhetoric is thus perpetually revealing “secret” motivations or un-
disclosed “truths” about institutions and figures of authority to remind citizens 
that they have not been seeing reality properly and need to adjust their outlook 
and allegiances accordingly. Like cinema, this rhetoric draws upon what can’t be 
seen in order to question what kind of enjoyment sustains the symbolic order.
Cinema might therefore be regarded as an important source of rhetorical 
instruction. But it is not simply because we so frequently find in films memo-
rable examples of oratory, representations of speech situations, or dramatically 
conveyed arguments, though that is certainly true. More than this, cinema il-
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luminates the way that subjects are lured into narratives, not merely by what 
they see and hear but by their attraction to what is absent. For it is this absence 
that, at least on a Lacanian reading, is the unconscious stimulus to subjectivity 
as such. In that respect, cinema offers an invaluable rhetorical lesson in how 
political speech might activate desire.
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